Own interest and foreign need: Are bilateral investment treaty programmes similar to aid allocation? by Eric Neumayer
Self-interest, foreign need and good governance: 
Are bilateral investment treaty programs similar to aid allocation?
∗ 
 




Dr Eric Neumayer 
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
Phone: 0207-955-7598. Fax: 0207-955-7412. Email: e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk 
 
                                                 
∗ This paper benefited from constructive comments of three anonymous referees. Financial assistance 
from the Leverhulme Trust is gratefully acknowledged. 
 Self-interest, foreign need and good governance: 
Are bilateral investment treaty programs similar to aid allocation? 
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important legal mechanism 
for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing 
countries. Yet practically no systematic evidence exists on what motivates capital-
exporting developed countries to sign BITs earlier with some developing countries than 
with others, if at all. The theoretical framework from the aid allocation literature 
suggests that developed countries pursue a mixture of self-interest, foreign need and, 
possibly, good governance. We find evidence that both economic interests of developed 
countries’ foreign investors and political interests of developed countries determine 
their scheduling of BITs. However, foreign need as measured by per capita income is 
also a factor, whereas good governance by and large does not matter. These results 
suggest that BIT programs can be explained employing the same framework 
successfully applied to the allocation of aid. At the same time, self-interest seems to be 
substantively more important than developing country need when it comes to BITs. 
1 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become an increasingly popular device for the 
encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. 
Starting in the late 1950s, BITs have seen a surge in the last two decades and have now 
become ‘the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and 
governance’ of FDI in developing countries (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2004, p. 
0).
1 Yet, surprisingly, we know very little about what drives countries to negotiate and 
conclude BITs. Elkins et al. (2004) pool all BITs between developed and developing 
countries and try to explain the spread of BITs by the increased competition for FDI 
among developing countries.
2 Developing countries are more likely to sign BITs with 
developed countries if their competitors have done so already. However, the pooling of 
all BITs can mask important differences across BIT signatories. Contrary to and thus 
complementing their analysis, which looks at BITs very much from the perspective of 
all developing countries, this study investigates BIT programs from the perspective of 
developed countries. Using a theoretical framework similar to the one familiar from the 
aid allocation literature (donor interest, recipient need and good governance), it aspires 
to answer the following questions: Why do certain developed countries sign BITs with 
some developing countries, but not with others, and sign with some at an earlier stage 
than with others? Do developed countries only pursue their own country’s self-interest 
                                                 
1 There are practically no BITs between developed countries. 
2 In the context of this article, the category of developed countries refers to the members of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with the exception of Mexico, 
Turkey and South Korea. Developing countries is the category for all other countries. 
2 in choosing among potential BIT partners or do they take the developing country’s 
need and the quality of its governance into account as well? 
Developed countries cannot determine to which foreign country their investors, 
mainly multi-national corporations (MNCs), channel their outward investment. 
However, they can try to influence the allocation decisions by rendering investment 
more attractive in certain locations. BITs represent an important mechanism in that 
respect, as we will demonstrate below. While the allocation of FDI is based on 
decisions by MNCs over which developed countries’ governments have only limited 
influence, BITs are state-to-state treaties over which governments have full control as 
part of their foreign policy. It follows that it is possible to apply the theoretical 
framework of developed country self-interest, developing country need and good 
governance to the scheduling of BITs, whereas it makes no sense to apply this 
framework to the allocation of FDI itself. 
This article is structured as follows: The next section portrays the rise of BITs and 
discusses their importance, followed by a discussion of determinants of BIT 
scheduling. Results are reported after a presentation of the research design and are 
followed by a conclusion. 
 
2. THE RISE OF BITS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE 
 
BITs are a phenomenon that arose at the end of the 1950s. Some trace their history 
back to the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) concluded by the 
United States (US) over centuries (Salacuse, 1990). The FCN treaties had the 
expansion of international trade and the improvement of US foreign relations as their 
prime purpose, even though some investment provisions were later added (Guzman, 
3 1998). They were also more designed to protect US citizens abroad rather than foreign 
investment per se. BITs on the other hand are more clearly focused on foreign 
investment protection. Germany, having lost most of her foreign investment during the 
Second World War, signed the very first BIT with Pakistan in 1959. After that, it took 
almost two decades before BITs gained momentum. By the end of the 1960s there were 
75 treaties, which rose to 167 by the end of the 1970s and to 389 by the end of the 
1980s. The number of BITs worldwide began to grow rapidly in the 1990s and by 2004 
there would be 2,392 BITs worldwide (UNCTAD, 2004a). 
The basic provisions of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) typically guarantee 
certain standards of treatment for the foreign investor (see Dolzer and Stevens, 1995; 
UNCTAD, 1998). By entering into a BIT, signatories agree to grant certain relative 
standards of treatment such as national treatment (foreign investors may not be treated 
any worse than national investors, but may be treated better and, in fact, often are) and 
most-favored nation treatment (privileges granted to one foreign investor must be 
granted to all foreign investors). They also agree to guarantee certain absolute standards 
of treatment such as fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors in accordance 
with international standards after the investment has taken place. BITs typically ban 
discriminatory treatment against foreign investors, include guarantees of compensation 
for expropriated property or funds and the free transfer and repatriation of capital and 
profits. Furthermore, the BIT parties agree to submit to binding dispute settlement 
should a dispute concerning these provisions arise (UNCTAD, 1998). Ostensibly, these 
provisions should secure some of the basic requirements for credible protection of 
property and contract right that foreign investors look for in host countries. They 
should also protect foreign investors against political and other risks highly prevalent in 
many developing countries.  
4 Many developing countries have adopted domestic legal changes with a view 
toward encouraging a greater FDI inflow (UNCTAD, 2004b). However, these domestic 
legal rules cannot substitute for the commitment device offered by entering into a 
legally binding bilateral treaty. BITs provide an answer to the basic “hold-up” or 
“dynamic inconsistency” problem that faces developing nations attempting to attract 
FDI. The dynamic inconsistency problem arises from the fact that although host 
countries have an incentive to promise fair and equitable treatment beforehand in order 
to attract foreign investment, once that investment is established and investors have 
sunk significant costs, the host country’s incentive is to exploit or even expropriate the 
assets of foreign investors. Even those host countries that are willing to forego taking 
advantage in these circumstances might find it very difficult to credibly commit to their 
position. BITs, and their binding investor-to-state dispute settlement provision in 
particular, are meant to overcome the dilemma facing host countries who are willing to 
denounce exploiting foreign investors after the investment has already been undertaken. 
Interestingly, at the same time as BITs flourished in the 1980s and 1990s, outright 
expropriations of foreign investors, which were common during the 1960s and 1970s, 
practically ceased to take place (Minor, 1994). 
In concluding BITs, developing countries are therefore ‘trading sovereignty for 
credibility’ (Elkins et al., 2004:4). In fact, virtually any public policy can potentially be 
challenged through the dispute settlement mechanism as long as it affects foreign 
investors. Often, foreign investors need not have exhausted domestic legal remedies 
and can thus bypass or avoid national legal systems, reaching straight for international 
arbitration, where they can freely choose one of the three panelists, their consensus is 
needed for one other panelist and where they can expect that the rules laid out in the 
BITs are fully applied (Peterson, 2004). This contrasts with domestic courts, where 
5 investors have no say on the composition of judges and where domestic rules might 
trump those contained in the BIT. 
Of course, not all BITs are identical. Some developed country investors like the 
United States often insist on some limited rights of its investors to establish investment 
in host countries in the first place, whereas investors’ rights in most BITs are restricted 
to fair and equitable treatment after the investment has already taken place and provide 
no right of investment (UNCTAD, 1999). United States BITs often prohibit certain 
performance requirements such as local content, employment and export requirements, 
whereas BIT programs of other developed countries do not contain such provisions 
(Vandevelde, 1998; OECD, 2004a). Conversely, some developing countries such as 
China and Eastern European countries have successfully managed to restrict the 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions to disputes concerning expropriation or the 
compensation thereof (Peters, 1996:107). The United Kingdom granted China 
limitations on national treatment for British investors in the mid-1980s, while insisting 
on full national treatment in its BITs with African countries during the same period of 
time (Peterson, 2004). However, by and large BITs tend to be rather similar in their 
general principles. 
BITs are costly to developing countries as they ‘seriously restrict the ability of host 
states to regulate foreign investment’ (Vandevelde, 2000:499). Indeed, some argue that 
collectively developing countries have no interest in BITs, which would explain their 
resistance against negotiating and signing BITs at multilateral fora such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Guzman, 1998). 
However, individually, developing countries also have a strong interest in signing BITs 
– a good example of the classical prisoner’s dilemma. What makes BITs of interest to 
developing countries, at least if concluded individually, are the potential benefits 
6 following from signing such treaties. The clearest benefit lies in the potential increase 
in inward FDI. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) 
found no evidence that BITs play any role in the allocation of FDI to developing 
countries. If true, this would mean that the enormous amount of effort and time both 
developed and developing countries have invested in concluding BITs has basically 
been wasted. However, Neumayer and Spess (2005) in a larger and more representative 
sample provide robust evidence that developing countries, which have signed a larger 
number of BITs with developed countries, receive more FDI inflows both in absolute 
amount and as a share of FDI flows going to developing countries. In addition, there 
can be other benefits of BITs to developing countries such as a prerequisite for bilateral 
free trade agreements with developed countries or as providing reform-minded 
governments with a signaling and commitment device. 
BITs are thus of great importance to developing countries, mainly for their desire to 
attract more foreign investment in order to spur their economic development. FDI has 
become increasingly important to developing countries as development aid has 
decreased due to tighter governmental budgets and decreased willingness of developed 
countries to assist. Only very recently have aid flows slightly increased again in the 
wake of the so-called Monterrey Consensus (OECD, 2004b). However, in 2003 FDI 
was the largest component of the net resource flows to developing countries and this is 
bound to remain the case for some time to come.  
Although the developed countries remain both the dominating source and the major 
recipient of FDI, their dominance has decreased over time with developing countries in 
2003 receiving almost 31% of total FDI as opposed to only about 20% in the 1980s 
(UNCTAD, 2004b). Indeed, FDI inflows per unit of GDP are much higher in many 
developing countries than in developed ones (ibid.). It is often asserted, however, that 
7 international investment flows, contrary to development aid, benefit mainly about a 
dozen developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe whereas the 
vast majority of poor countries, especially in Africa, are left out. This assertion is 
correct in the sense that countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Venezuela in Latin 
America, Azerbaijan, China, Singapore, Malaysia, and India in Asia as well as the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in Eastern Europe together received 68 per cent 
of the FDI flows to developing countries in 2003 and more than 16 times more than the 
combined FDI to all least developed countries together (UNCTAD, 2004b, annex table 
B.1). However, the picture is much less uneven if one looks at FDI as a percentage of 
gross fixed capital formation rather than at FDI expressed in absolute figures. This 
percentage was 13.9 for Africa in 2003, actually higher than the developing countries 
average of 10 per cent or that of mainland China, the single most important FDI 
recipient in absolute terms, at 12.4 per cent (UNCTAD, 2004b, annex table B.5). 
 
3. DETERMINANTS OF BIT SCHEDULING 
 
Given the enormous importance that BITs have for encouraging FDI and protecting 
foreign investors from developed countries, the question arises what motivates 
developed countries to conclude BITs with some developing countries, but not others, 
and with some earlier than with others? To answer these questions, we will borrow 
from the theoretical framework used in the aid allocation literature. Ever since 
McKinlay and Little (1977), it has become common in this literature to distinguish 
between factors of donor interest and recipient need, both of which are expected to 
influence the allocation of aid to developing countries (see, for example, Trumbull and 
Wall, 1994; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). What is less 
8 commonly known is that McKinlay and Little already tested for the role of what they 
called ‘political stability and democracy’ on aid allocation. The focus of many later aid 
allocation studies on aspects of good governance, particularly democracy and human 
rights (see, for example, Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Carleton and Stohl, 1987; 
Poe, 1992; Svensson, 1999; Neumayer, 2003), can therefore also be traced back to 
McKinlay and Little (1977). Can this framework be transplanted to the scheduling of 
BITs? 
What kinds of self-interest could a developed country promote in signing a BIT? 
BITs promote the economic interests of foreign investors, so unsurprisingly these 
investors push for BITs to be signed. As Ramamurti (2001:37) has put it: ‘MNCs 
would be well advised to continue lobbying their home governments to sign more 
bilateral investment treaties with developing countries’. Foreign investors are 
particularly interested in gaining investor protection in countries that promise a high 
rate of return to FDI. From studies on the allocation of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001; 
Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef, 2001; Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003), we can 
derive that they are particularly interested in investing in developing countries with a 
large economy, with high per capita incomes, with a good level of human skills, 
endowed with large natural resource deposits and in countries that are open to trade so 
that intermediate products can be easily imported and the produced goods and services 
can be exported to world markets. While these are private companies’ interests, most 
developed country governments are known to promote their companies’ interests in 
multilateral fora, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Ramamurti, 2001). Also, in visits to 
foreign countries they are often accompanied by representatives from their country’s 
business groups. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
9  
H1: Developed countries are more likely to sign BITs with developing countries 
in whose markets developed country investors have an economic interest. 
 
But BITs are about more than economics only, they are about more than paving the 
way for a developed country’s investors. They establish a new relationship between the 
state parties with rights and obligations. Indeed, even if rarely used, BITs almost 
always contain a provision for state-to-state dispute settlement (UNCTAD, 2003). It 
can therefore be presumed that developed countries are keen to sign BITs with 
developing countries, in which they have political interests as well, including military-
strategic ones. This fits well into a (neo-)realist conception, in which powerful 
developed countries engage in bilateral co-operation according to their own country’s 
self-interest, broadly defined, which resembles the donor interest explanation of the 
allocation of overseas development assistance (ODA) by developed countries 
(Neumayer 2003). The second hypothesis is therefore: 
 
H2: Developed countries are more likely to sign BITs with developing countries 
in which they have political interests. 
 
Elkins et al. (2004) argue instead that the scheduling of BITs is not determined by 
developed countries, but by developing countries, which have periods of program 
activity in which they sign BITs with developed countries. There are, however, a 
number of reasons that would suggest that the scheduling of BITs is also, if not mainly, 
determined by developed countries and their interests. To start with, BITs are a rather 
one-sided game in which developing countries make many concessions, whilst 
10 developed countries typically refuse to do much. For example, they have ‘steadfastly 
refused to agree to any provision obligating them to encourage or induce their nationals 
to invest in the foreign state’ (Salacuse, 1990:661). The focus of provisions in BITs 
‘has always been the rights of the investors, and concomitant obligations of the host 
governments’ (von Moltke, 2004:iii). Furthermore, developed countries typically have 
a model BIT and they have invested much time and effort into its development. In the 
words of Salacuse (1990:661 and 662): ‘The movement to conclude BITs has been 
initiated and driven by Western, capital-exporting states’. Developing countries have 
no such model BIT. Instead, they are expected to sign, with few modifications, the 
standard BIT of their developed country partner. A strong influence of developed 
countries’ interests on the scheduling of BITs is not contradicted by the fact, pointed 
out by Elkins et al. (2004), that the BIT programs of developed countries do not look 
like clusters or peaks in certain years, but are more evenly spread over a longer period 
of time. Developed countries might simply choose some developing countries as BIT 
partners first according to their self-interest. As returns to FDI in certain locations 
decrease and, more generally, developed countries’ self-interests evolve and change 
over time, further countries are invited to become BIT partners. Our empirical 
specification, which models time until signature, is capable of capturing these nuances. 
A good test is to see whether developed country interests play an important role in 
the timing of their BIT signings. If they do, then it would seem that BIT schedules are 
to no small degree determined by developed countries. This is not to say that 
developing countries have no influence at all. After all, they can always refuse to sign a 
BIT. Also, as UNCTAD (1998:22) notes, developing countries somewhat changed their 
attitude in the 1990s toward actively seeking BITs with other countries, including 
developed ones, instead of merely passively responding to invitations by developed 
11 countries. But the developed country as well can refuse to engage in negotiations and 
without doubt it is in a stronger position, being the source, not the recipient, of the 
expected FDI flow increase.
3 
And yet, from the allocation of aid we know that developed countries are not 
entirely driven by selfish motivations. Instead, they also take the need of developing 
countries into account. Would we expect that recipient need also impacts BIT 
schedules? Not necessarily so. Development assistance or aid giving are clearly based, 
at least in part, on altruistic or moral justifications, not least in the eyes of the tax-
paying developed countries’ publics (Noël and Thérien, 1995). Despite the great 
importance of FDI to developing countries, the promotion of FDI via BITs might be 
regarded as something that should serve the developed country’s own economic and 
political interest rather than foreign need. Certainly, there is no similar pressure from 
the public and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a development mission 
that BITs should take recipient need into account as there is for the allocation of aid. 
From these considerations, we derive the next hypothesis: 
 
H3: Developed countries are not more likely to sign BITs with developing 
countries that are in greater need of FDI. 
 
                                                 
3 The latest trend is for developing countries to conclude BITs amongst themselves. This is somewhat at 
odds with both Elkins, Guzman and Simmons’ (2004) as well as this author’s interpretation of the 
determinants of BIT scheduling. However, it should be noted that this has been a very recent 
development and that the vast majority of BITs is concluded between a developed and a developing 
country. 
12 Finally, as concerns the possible role of good governance, for the allocation of aid, 
most of the existing literature has focused on the case of US development assistance, 
particularly with respect to democracy and human rights (see, for example, Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello, 1985; Carleton and Stohl, 1987; Poe, 1992; Abrams and Lewis, 1993; 
Apodaca and Stohl, 1999). Due to different research designs, studies naturally come to 
different conclusions, but most of these studies confirm that more democratic and 
countries with a better human rights record are somewhat more likely to receive US aid 
and are likely to receive a higher level of aid. Few studies look at aid allocation by 
other donor countries (see, for example, Sevensson, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Neumayer, 2003). Most find some evidence that Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, a group of countries sometimes referred to as the like-minded countries, 
as well as Germany, the UK and some other donors also reward democracy and respect 
for human rights. When it comes to BIT schedules, however, the question is again 
whether there is any willingness on the part of developed countries to make good 
governance a prerequisite for the benefit of becoming a BIT partner. Contrary to aid 
allocation, for which there are many public statements by donors that they will take 
good governance into account (e.g., OECD, 1994) even though they might not do so in 
actual reality, to my knowledge there are no similar statements when it comes to BITs. 
Of course, some argue that democracy and other aspects of good governance promote 
private investment in developing countries (Feng, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; 
Jensen, 2003) so that foreign investors might have an interest in their country signing a 
BIT with democratic developing countries. However, democracy’s effect is ambiguous 
both in theory and empirical evidence (Li and Resnick, 2003). Also, in Feng (2001), 
democracy’s effect works mainly through the build-up of human capital, which we 
control for directly, whereas Jensen (2003) argues that democracy lowers country risk, 
13 which is of course the very purpose of BITs, such that there might not be any remaining 
independent effect for democracy left. We therefore formulate as our final hypothesis: 
 
H4: Developed countries are not more likely to sign BITs with developing 
countries that are more democratic or more protective of human rights. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The dependent variables 
 
With 23 OECD countries, it would be impossible to look at each developed country’s 
BIT program individually. We therefore adopt two approaches of estimation. In the 
first approach, we look at the cumulative number of BITs a developing country has 
signed with any of the OECD countries. The first dependent variable is therefore a 
strictly positive count variable. In the second approach, we look at individual BIT 
programs of the seven most important foreign investors in developing countries 
according to UNCTAD figures, namely (in brackets the year the first BIT was signed): 
France (1960), Germany (1959), Italy (1964), Japan (1977), the Netherlands (1963), the 
United Kingdom (1975), and the United States (1982). The appendix provides a 
detailed list of BIT partners of these developed countries together with the year of 
signature.
4 The dependent variable for each individual developed country whose BIT 
program we look at is of the event history type (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). It 
captures the time that elapses between the start of its BIT program and the signature of 
                                                 
4 Due to missing data on explanatory variables, not all BITs enter the estimations. 
14 a BIT with a particular developing country.
5 Developing countries become “at risk” of 
signing a BIT at the start of the developed country’s BIT program or the year of their 
national independence, if later. They exit the sample at the time of BIT signature. In the 
very few cases, in which developing countries have signed a BIT twice (presumably 
with some modifications to its contents), we take the date of first signature. If no BIT is 
signed, countries remain “at risk” of signing a BIT until 2001, the end of our study 
period. Such observations are said to be right-censored. Data are taken from UNCTAD 
(2000, 2004a).  
 
The estimation techniques 
 
For our first approach, because the dependent variable is a discrete, strictly positive 
count variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) is not well suited as a regression 
technique, because its underlying distributional assumption is that of a normally-
distributed continuous variable. We therefore use the negative binomial regression with 
standard errors that are robust toward arbitrary heteroskedasticity, which contrary to the 
Poisson model does not assume that the conditional mean and the variance functions of 
the dependent variable are equal.
6 In addition, observations are assumed to be 
                                                 
5 We look at signature rather than ratification for a number of reasons. First, the ratification date is often 
not given in our sources, either because it is unknown or because the BIT has never been ratified. 
Second, some countries find it difficult to ratify international treaties for constitutional and other 
domestic political reasons. For our purposes, the signature of a BIT is what matters as it signals the 
willingness of one country’s government to enter into a bilateral relationship with another country’s 
government. 
6 A likelihood ratio test rejects the Poisson regression model assumption with a chi-sq test statistic of 
880.46 (p<0.0000). 
15 independent across developing countries, but not necessarily within member states over 
time. That is, observations are allowed to be clustered on countries, which makes sense 
given that we observe the number of BITs on the same countries over time. 
Furthermore, we include year-specific time dummy variables to account for global 
changes in the likelihood of signing BITs unrelated to our explanatory variables and 
common to all developing countries. 
To estimate our event history models we employ the Cox (1975) proportional 
hazards estimator. Cox’s estimator assumes that there is a time-variant underlying 
baseline hazard of a certain event occurring at any point in time. In the medical 
sciences, the event is often death, in engineering it is often the failure of an appliance, 
but in principle it can be anything. In our case, the event of interest is the signing of a 
BIT with a developing country and what is modeled is the duration time until signature. 
Explanatory variables raise or lower the baseline hazard by a proportional amount, 
which is why it is called a proportional hazard model. The estimated coefficients are 
not directly comparable to the ones from a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
probit/logit estimator, but their intuitive meaning is similar: A coefficient with positive 
sign raises the likelihood of BIT signature, whereas the opposite is the case for a 
coefficient with a negative sign. 
More formally, the hazard rate in a given year is the probability of signature in that 
year, contingent on the country not having signed a BIT with the developed country in 
the previous year. Let ρ(t) be the probability of signature at time t (given that the 
country has not signed a BIT before t); this is the hazard of signature. Denoting ρ0(t) 
the exogenous baseline hazard, which reflects those time-dependent factors affecting 




Tx(t)),        (1) 
 
where x(t) is a vector of covariates shifting the baseline hazard, and β
T is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Notice that covariates change over time. 
A partial Maximum Likelihood estimation is carried out, where the partial 
likelihood function is constructed as follows. Assume that all events of failure or, in our 
case, signature can be ordered along a continuous time dimension. We want to calculate 
the probability that, contingent on an event taking place at time ti, it is country i that 





























ρ .     (2) 
 
The numerator denotes the hazard at time ti that country i would sign a BIT divided 
by the sum of all the hazards for all the countries who were at risk at time ti. Note that 
the baseline hazards cancel each other out as they enter both the numerator and the 
denominator. The partial likelihood function to be maximized with respect to the vector 
β
T is then simply 
 
L = ∏
i t i i t ) ( ˆ ρ ,       ( 3 )  
 
that is, each observed signature contributes one term like (2) to the partial 
likelihood – see Collett (1999) for more details.  
17 One of the great advantages of the Cox estimator is that there is no need to estimate 
the underlying determinants of the baseline hazard, which depend, possibly in a 
complex way, on unobserved variables. The only requirement of the estimator is that 
the explanatory variables raise or lower the baseline hazard by a constant proportional 
amount, an assumption, which can be readily tested. As a semi-parametric model, the 
Cox estimator depends on less-restrictive assumptions than the fully parametric 
Exponential, Weibull, Gamma, or other estimators, which lead to more precise 
estimates only if the underlying probability distribution assumes a specific 
corresponding functional form (Collett, 1999). For dealing with “ties”, that is, when 
several countries sign a BIT with a developed country in the same year, we employ the 
so-called Efron method, which is an approximation of the exact marginal likelihood.
7 
All estimations are based on a robust variance estimator and observations are assumed 
to be clustered, that is, they are assumed to be independent only across developing 
countries, but are allowed to be correlated within countries over time.  
 
The explanatory variables 
 
A whole range of variables that cover different aspects of developed countries’ 
investors’ economic interest are used to test hypothesis 1. These variables are mainly 
drawn from the empirical evidence on what host country characteristics render 
investment attractive to foreign investors – despite the fact that the empirical literature 
truly agrees on only few factors (Chakrabarti, 2001). Unless otherwise noted, all data 
are taken from World Bank (2003). Firstly, we use a developing country’s total gross 
                                                 
7 We experimented with various methods for dealing with ties, which showed that the choice of method 
hardly affects our estimation results. 
18 domestic product (GDP) in constant dollars of 1995 as well as per capita income, both 
in logged form, as measures of market size (ln GDP and ln GDP p.c.). The bigger the 
market, the more attractive it is for foreign investors to enter the market. Second, FDI is 
often undertaken with the intention of exporting the produced goods to the world 
market. Also, some primary and intermediate goods need to be imported to produce the 
goods in foreign owned companies at the highest quality and lowest price. Countries 
that are more open to trade are therefore more attractive destinations for FDI and we 
use the sum of exports and imports divided by a country’s GDP as a measure of its 
trade openness (%trade). Note, however, that the effect of trade openness on FDI is not 
unambiguous (Taylor, 2000) since high trade barriers could make it in a company’s 
best interest to locate production within the host country in order to circumvent the 
import barriers. Third, besides market size, the skills and human capital of a developing 
country represent an important attractor of FDI (Noorbakhsh et al. 2001). We therefore 
include the gross secondary enrolment ratio as a proxy variable for educational level 
achieved (%secondary-edu). Ideally, one would like to measure educational attainment 
directly. However, data from Barro and Lee (2001) have more gaps than the enrolment 
ratio. In sensitivity analysis, we also include two measures of resource abundance to 
account for the fact that some countries receive FDI into their primary sector. The first 
measures fuel, ores and mineral exports as a share of total merchandise exports. The 
second measures rents from fossil, mineral and metal resource extraction relative to 
gross national income. Both variables lack data for many countries and years and are 
therefore included in sensitivity analysis, but not included in the main estimations. 
Next are variables of developed country political interest, which are relevant for 
testing hypothesis 2. First, where relevant we use a variable measuring the number of 
years a developing country has been a colony of the developed country over the period 
19 1900 to 1960 (years colony) (data from Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Former colonial 
powers usually have remaining interests in their former colonies. Second, since we 
expect that it is in donors’ interest to sign BITs with “friendly” and “close” countries, 
we use a political similarity variable that draws from voting behavior in the UN 
General Assembly. Signorino and Ritter (1999) have developed a measure of political 
similarity, which conceptualizes two political positions as falling within a space 
defined by all possible political positions. The measure falls in the interval -1 to 1, 
where -1 means that two political positions are as far apart in the space as possible 
(complete dissimilarity) and 1 means that the two political positions are identical 
(complete similarity). Gartzke, Jo and Tucker (1999) use this measure to provide 
estimates of the similarity of political positions as revealed by the voting behavior in 
the UN General Assembly (political similarity).
8 Third, to see whether developed 
countries are more likely to sign BITs with developing countries, in which they have a 
military-strategic interest, we include a variable measuring the amount of US military 
grants to this country as a share of total US military grants allocated (%US military 
grants) (data from USAID, 2004). The idea behind using this variable is that countries 
that receive high United States military grants can be regarded as allies to Western 
countries and strategically important countries. Ideally, we would have liked to include 
similar information from other developed countries as well, but no sufficient data exist. 
Fourth, some OECD countries might want to promote a sphere of influence among 
                                                 
8 For Germany, no data were available after 1991. They were substituted with the relevant variable for 
Austria. The idea is that Austria proxies Germany’s political positions well given that it shares the same 
language and a similar culture with its bigger neighbor. Also, since this variable has only been coded 
until 1996, the 1996 value was taken over for the rest of the period for all countries. Results are hardly 
affected if we restrict the estimations to the period up to 1996 instead. 
20 countries geographically close to them for strategic reasons. We therefore include the 
natural log of the geographical distance (ln distance) between the OECD country’s and 
the developing country’s capital (Haveman, 2000). 
As concerns hypothesis 3, the single most common, arguably most relevant 
indicator and frequently only variable of developing country need used is a country’s 
level of per capita income. Ideally, it represents the power of the average citizen to 
purchase the goods and services for the benefit of his or her welfare. The lower this 
power is, the poorer on average a country is and therefore the more in need of aid or 
FDI. Given that per capita income is also a variable of developed country investors’ 
economic interest, which would lead us to opposite expectations, a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient sign for the per capita income variable would 
provide strong evidence that developing country need is of importance to developed 
countries in their choice of BIT partner as it would signal that need is dominating this 
specific aspect of developed country investors’ economic interest. In our context, one 
further obvious candidate of developing country need is the existing stock of FDI the 
country has relative to its GDP. Countries with a small FDI stock are in greater need. 
Unfortunately, FDI data reported by UNCTAD (2004a) are only available from 1970 
onwards. We therefore use the FDI stock variable only in sensitivity analysis. 
With respect to hypothesis 4, we include the well-known Polity data (Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr, 2003) as our measure of democracy. A human rights measure based 
on data from the Purdue Political Terror Scales (Gibney, 2004) is only available for the 
period after 1980 and therefore not included in the main estimations, but in sensitivity 
analysis. It averages the scale based on information from the US State Department with 
that based on amnesty international reports. 
21 In terms of control variables, considering that BITs function as substitutes for good 
domestic institutional quality and as insurance against political risk, one would ideally 
want to control for the fact that developed countries might see less reason to conclude a 
BIT with developing countries with better institutions since there is less reason to seek 
an external credibility device for such countries. The problem is that standard measures 
of institutional quality from, for example, the World Bank’s governance database or the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are not available over a long period of time. 
We therefore follow Elkins et al. (2004) and include a dummy variable for common 
law countries (common law), taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999). Common law countries are regarded as being more protective of 
property rights, having better investor protection, greater judicial independence and 
more developed capital markets. Developed countries might therefore see less need to 
conclude a BIT with common law countries. 
Table 1 provides summary descriptive variable statistics. Note that the information 
in table 1 refers to the sample used in the first approach with the cumulative number of 
BITs as the dependent variable since sample size differs from country to country in the 
second approach. For the first approach, where variables differ across the OECD 
partner countries, average values were taken. For example, the distance variable reflects 
the natural log of the average distance of developing countries to OECD countries. The 
exception is the colonial status, which refers to the number of years a developing 
country has been a former colony of any OECD country. For the second approach, 
where we look at individual OECD country BIT programs we can of course use the 
specific rather than average values, i.e., distance, political similarity, and former 
colonial status of the specific OECD country looked at. 




We start with presenting results in table 2 for the first approach with the cumulative 
number of BITs as the dependent variable. Results partly confirm hypothesis 1. 
Developing countries with some characteristics that find the economic interest of 
developed countries’ investors are estimated to have signed a higher number of BITs 
with OECD countries. Specifically, a larger market size and an economy that is more 
open to trade are estimated to have a higher cumulative number of BITs. However, the 
educational level is insignificant and per capita income is statistically significant, but 
with a negative coefficient sign – a result to which we come back shortly. Results fully 
confirm hypothesis 2 concerning the political interests OECD countries pursue with 
their BIT programs. Former colonies, politically similar and developing countries more 
closely located to developed countries as well as receiving a higher share of US 
military aid have signed more BITs. Hypothesis 3 is rejected: Poorer developing 
countries have signed more BITs as the theoretical concept of developing country need 
would suggest, not less BITs as developed countries’ investors’ economic interests 
would suggest. Results confirm hypothesis 4 since the democratic status of developing 
countries has no statistically significant impact. Common law countries have a lower 
number of BITs, as expected. 
< Insert table 2 around here > 
Next, the question is whether the results presented so far, which hold for a sample 
that includes all BITs with OECD countries, also hold for individual countries or 
whether there are important differences among the major capital exporting countries. 
To answer this question, we move on to our second approach. Column I of table 3 
23 reports results for the BIT program of Germany. Developing countries that have a 
larger market size, are more open toward foreign trade and boast a better educational 
level stand a higher chance of signing a BIT (early on) with Germany. But politics 
matters in addition to economics: Former colonies of Germany and developing 
countries with similar political positions as revealed by their voting behavior in the UN 
General Assembly are also more likely to sign a BIT (early on). A country’s military-
strategic importance as proxied by United States military grants and its geographical 
distance do not matter. Neither does the type of legal system. Germany’s BIT program 
is therefore clearly influenced by economic and political interests. At the same time, 
however, the negative and highly statistically significant coefficient sign of the per 
capita income variable shows that developing country need is also taken into account as 
Germany is more likely to sign a BIT with poorer than richer countries. The regime 
type of developing countries does not matter. 
Column II looks at the British BIT program. As was the case with Germany, larger 
market size, educational level and trade openness render a developing country more 
attractive to the United Kingdom as BIT partner. The UK pursues different political 
interests than Germany, however. Neither political similarity nor former colonial links 
matter, but developing country’s with higher military-strategic importance are more 
likely BIT partners. As with Germany, Britain is more likely to sign (early on) a BIT 
with poorer developing countries. Democracy and the type of legal system do not 
matter. 
France is the developed country looked at next, for which results are reported in 
column III. Market size, educational level and trade openness matter in line with 
expectations. When it comes to political interests, France is in between Britain and 
Germany: Similar to the UK, former colonial links do not matter and the military-
24 strategic importance of a developing country boosts its chances of signing a BIT with 
France. Similar to Germany, politically similar developing countries are more likely 
BIT partners. Like Germany and Britain, France does not give preference to 
geographically closer countries and France is also more likely to sign a BIT with poorer 
rather than richer developing countries. Common law countries are less likely BIT 
partners of France, but as with Germany and the UK, the developing country’s regime 
type does not matter. 
For Italy as well, both economic and political interests matter (column IV). Larger 
market size and a higher educational level render a developing country more attractive 
as BIT partner, but not its extent of trade openness. The military-strategic importance 
of a developing country is insignificant. Like Germany, Italy gives preference to former 
colonies and politically similar countries. The same is true for poorer countries, 
suggesting that like the other developed countries, Italy too takes a developing 
country’s need into account. Democracy is marginally significant, but the negative 
coefficient sign is contrary to expectation as more democratic countries are less likely 
to be Italy’s BIT partner. The type of legal system does not matter. 
Japan is the first developed country with a preference for geographically close 
countries (column V). Larger economies and countries with a higher share of US 
military grants are also more likely BIT partners as are poorer countries. Nothing else is 
statistically significant. The reader should note, however, that the results for Japan need 
to be treated with some caution as there are only few BIT partners, which renders the 
estimation inefficient and results are heavily influenced by these few observations. 
Results for the United States are reported in column VI. Note that while the US has 
had a few former colonies (the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and the 
Philippines), none of these countries has signed a BIT with the US. The former colony 
25 variable would thus predict failure to conclude a BIT with the US perfectly and is 
therefore excluded from the model. Like Japan, the US gives preference to 
geographically close countries. Neither total market size nor a developing country’s 
extent of trade openness matter. Countries with a higher educational level are more 
likely BIT partners, however. So are countries of military-strategic importance 
receiving a higher share of US military grants, as one would expect. As with all the 
other developed countries, the US is more likely to sign a BIT with a poorer than with a 
richer developing country. Common law countries are less likely partners and regime 
type does not matter. 
Few aspects of interest impact upon the Dutch BIT program, for which results are 
reported in column VII. Countries with larger market size and former Dutch colonies 
are more likely to have signed (early on) a BIT with the Netherlands. However, none of 
the other interest variables matter. Poorer developing countries are more likely BIT 
partners. Neither the type of legal system nor regime type matter. 
< Insert table 3 around here > 
Statistical significance is not equivalent to substantive importance. Just how 
important are the various variables? In table 4 we compare the effect of a one standard 
deviation (SD) increase in one of the explanatory variables on the total count of BITs, 
with reference to the results reported in table 2, as well as on the hazard of BIT 
signature with individual developed countries, with reference to the results reported in 
table 3. Table 4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in economic size raises 
the expected total count of BITs by 77.4 per cent, by far the strongest effect of all the 
explanatory variables. This is followed in terms of substantive importance by per capita 
income and trade openness as well as the common law dummy variable. In comparison, 
the variables that capture political interests are relatively less important. The combined 
26 substantive impact of donor interest is clearly stronger than the effect of developing 
country need, as approximated by developing country per capita income. This message 
basically carries over to the analysis of individual BIT programs as well. The 
percentage increase in the hazard of BIT signature can be computed as 
((exp(SD*coefficient)-1)*100). Table 4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
per capita income lowers the hazard of signature by somewhere between 35.4 and 68.2 
per cent. Of the developed country interest variables, the economic variables seem to be 
of dominating substantive importance. One standard deviation increases in total 
economic size and in the level of educational achievement have quite strong effects on 
the hazard of BIT signature. The political interest variables, particularly the military-
strategic variable, have a comparatively smaller effect, except for Japan. Clearly, in all 
cases the combined substantive effect of the variables capturing developed country’s 
self-interest is stronger, and often much stronger, than the effect of developing country 
need. 
< Insert table 4 around here > 
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Global tests for the underlying proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld 
residuals reported in table 3 reject the assumption at conventional levels for the BIT 
programs of Germany, the Netherlands and the US. Even when global tests fail to reject 
the assumption, tests of the individual co-variates can still reject the proportional 
hazards assumption for specific variables. We therefore interacted all variables, for 
which individual tests rejected the assumption at the 5 per cent level with the log of 
years since the start of the BIT program of each country, which is a standard procedure 
27 for dealing with non-proportionality (see Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003). 
Doing so suggests modifications to the results reported above as follows:
9 For 
Germany, the positive effect of trade openness is slowly diminishing over time without 
ever turning negative. Once non-proportionality is allowed for, geographical distance 
starts to matter for the German BIT program: More proximate countries are estimated 
to be more likely signatories in the beginning, but the effect is diminishing over time 
and for the last decade or so more distant countries are estimated to have become more 
likely signatories. For the UK, the effect of the military-strategic importance of a 
country is very strongly positive in the beginning of the BIT program, diminishing 
rapidly over time and becomes negative in the latter half of the 1990s. For France, the 
Schoenfeld residuals tests did not call for interacting any variables. As concerns the 
Italian BIT program, the test results called for interacting the UN roll vote and the 
common law variables with time, but neither interaction effect was statistically 
significant. For Japan, with the exception of the very early years, the preference for 
geographically close BIT partners is confirmed and is found to be increasing over time. 
The statistically insignificant result of economic size found for the BIT program of the 
US was found to be the result of the proportionality assumption. Once it is interacted 
with time, larger economies are first more likely BIT partners, but then from about the 
mid-1990s less likely partners. With the exception of the early years, the positive effect 
of a country’s level of education is confirmed and the effect is increasing over time. For 
the Dutch BIT program, the insignificance of the trade and the geographical distance 
variables in the main estimations is due to the proportionality assumption. Once non-
proportionality is allowed for, preference is given to more trade-open countries and 
                                                 
9 All non-reported results available upon request. 
28 geographically closer countries, but the effect is diminishing over time and eventually 
reversed approximately in the mid-1990s. 
In further sensitivity analysis, we added the human rights variable to the models. It 
is statistically insignificant for the estimation with the cumulative number of BITs as 
dependent variable, but the UK, the US and France are less likely to conclude a BIT 
with a developing country engaged in gross human rights violations. Next, we included 
the existing stock of FDI relative to GDP as well as each of our two measures of 
resource intensity in the estimations. Typically, none of these additional variables 
assumed statistical significance, leaving the results mainly unchanged. We also 
included a dummy variable for Latin American countries to account for the fact that, 
initially at least, this group of countries was reluctant to sign BITs as they were strong 
proponents of the so-called Calvo Doctrine
10, which favored domestic final jurisdiction 
and opposed international arbitration. They were also supporters of ideas surrounding a 
‘New International Economic Order’ (UNCTAD, 1998:8f.), which goes against many 
provisions contained in BITs. Latin American countries have fewer BITs with OECD 
countries conditional on the other explanatory variables, but for the individual BIT 
partners looked at here, we find a statistically significant negative effect only for the 
UK and Japan. One might wonder whether communist countries are systematically less 
likely to become BIT partners due to the capitalist and market-oriented foundation of 
such treaties. However, many Eastern European countries like Bulgaria, Romania and 
Yugoslavia have been willing to sign BITs even though they were still under 
communist rule and other countries that are still communist (notionally at least), such 
as China and Vietnam, have also been keen BIT signatories. From a developed country 
perspective, it can even be attractive to sign a BIT with these countries as they often 
                                                 
10 Named after the Argentine diplomat and historian Carlos Calvo, 1824-1906. 
29 have market potential, enormous rates of return to investment, but fail to provide a well 
developed and reliable legal system. Including a dummy variable for communism, 
based on and extending information contained in Kornai (1992), suggested that 
Germany and Italy were more likely to sign BITs with communist countries, but such 
countries did not have a statistically significantly different number of total BITs with 
OECD countries, nor were other individual OECD countries looked at here more or 
less likely to sign BITs with countries under communist rule. 
Military-strategic interest is a concept that is difficult to measure. Above, we noted 
that the use of US military aid as a proxy variable is far from ideal. We therefore tried 
other variables such as military expenditures relative to GDP and general arms imports 
relative to total imports, but in addition to lower availability, these variables never 
assumed statistical significance in line with theoretical expectations. The same is true 
for a dummy variable for non-communist countries contiguous to communist countries. 
Some studies of the aid allocation literature have found significant differences between 
the Cold War and post-Cold War period (see, for example, Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 
1998). In particular, it is found that military-strategic interests were no longer relevant 
in the post-Cold War period. When we divided the sample from our first approach with 
the cumulative number of BITs as the dependent variable into one sub-sample up to 
and including 1989 and another one from 1990 onwards, then we also find that 
military-strategic interest as approximated by the share of US military aid is clearly 
statistically significant in the Cold War sub-sample, but is nowhere near statistical 
significance afterwards with the remaining variables largely unaffected. Splitting 
samples in similar fashion for the individual BIT programs of France, the UK and the 
US revealed that such interests are statistically significant in the Cold War sub-sample, 
but not for the post-Cold War period in the case of France and the UK, whereas they 
30 remain significant for the US throughout. Note that for Japan, for which we found 
military-strategic interests also to matter in the full sample, no sub-sample analysis can 




Developing countries are partners to more BITs with OECD countries if they have 
characteristics that make them economically attractive to developed countries’ 
investors and politically attractive to developed countries’ governments. At the same 
time, poorer developing countries have more, not fewer, BITs, which suggests that 
developing country need also plays a role in developed countries’ BIT programs. Good 
governance in the form of either democracy or human rights protection does not matter. 
When we looked at individual country BIT programs rather than all BITs with 
developed countries taken together, we found that what is true at the aggregate level by 
and large holds true for individual developed countries that are the most important 
capital exporters to developing countries as well. In particular, all of them pursue a 
mixture of economic and political interests, take developing country need into account 
and ignore regime type in developing countries. As concerns economic interests, 
market size and a developing country’s achieved educational level seem to be the most 
important factors. Political interests are more varied, however. Political similarity 
matters only to Germany, France and Italy. Interestingly, France and the United 
Kingdom, which had a great many former colonies, do not give preferential treatment 
to their former colonies. This stands in contrast to the two countries’ aid allocation, 
which is heavily biased toward their former colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Neumayer, 2003). One possible explanation could be that the great number of former 
31 French and British colonies comprise a group too varied to deserve general preferential 
BIT treatment from the perspective of their former colonial rulers. The European 
countries with few former colonies (Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) all provide 
preferential treatment to their former dependent countries. But the US and Japan do not. 
Indeed, the US has not signed a BIT with any of its former colonies. A possible 
explanation is that with the exception of the Philippines, former US colonies are all 
small Pacific island countries that are hardly interesting to US investors. Japan has 
signed one BIT with a former colony, namely South Korea, but did so only late in 
2001. Japanese relations with its former colonies are of course notoriously difficult. 
Some developed countries are more likely to sign a BIT with a developing country 
of military-strategic interest to the West. Not surprisingly, this is true for the big 
developed countries with global military ambitions, namely France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. It is not true for the other Western European countries 
without such military ambitions, namely Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, but it is 
also true for Japan. This might seem surprising, but the aid allocation literature 
similarly finds that Japan, despite or perhaps because of the smallness of its military 
and defense budget, is willing to give preferential treatment to countries of Western 
military-strategic interest (Katada, 1997; Neumayer, 2003). Japan and the US are the 
only two countries to give preference to geographically close developing countries, 
which mirrors similar findings of the promotion of regional spheres of influence from 
the aid allocation literature. 
Strikingly, all developed countries looked at are more likely to sign a BIT with 
poorer than richer developing countries, despite the fact that their economic interest 
would call for the reverse. This would suggest that they do take developing country 
need into account. Similar to aid allocation, BIT programs can therefore be interpreted 
32 as fulfilling the same two basic functions of self-interest and foreign need. Contrary to 
aid allocation, good governance in the form of democracy does not play any role in BIT 
programs. Countries with greater human rights violations do not have fewer BITs 
overall, but such countries are less likely to have a BIT with France, the UK and the 
US. 
In terms of substantive importance rather than merely statistical significance, the 
variables capturing developed countries’ self-interests are clearly more important than 
developing country need. This stands in some contrast to the allocation of aid, for 
which donor interest does not clearly outperform recipient need in terms of substantive 
effect (Neumayer, 2003). It is perhaps not surprising that BIT programs are more 
interest-oriented, particularly according to economic interest, than overseas 
development assistance, ostensibly meant to aid the poor. 
In terms of future research, explaining why some developed countries have signed 
more BITs in total numbers than others and why some have started earlier than others 
with their BIT program is beyond the scope of the present article, but is a promising 
area of study. One plausible reason why the US has started to sign BITs at a relatively 
late stage compared to the other big developed countries is that, as mentioned above, it 
famously often insists on certain standards prior to the investment in the developing 
country (UNCTAD, 1999). This raises the costs of entering into a BIT for a developing 
country with the US, perhaps to an extent that the expected benefits of increased FDI 
flows no longer exceed the costs. Another reason is that it took some time for the 
country to accept that the global trend was moving toward the BITs pioneered by 
European countries and that the FCN treaties, favored by the United States, were 
simply outdated. 
33 In conclusion, the BIT programs of developed countries are clearly influenced by 
both economic and political interests of the developed country partner. At the same 
time, they are also influenced by developing country need. The BIT programs, which 
despite their immense importance have been largely ignored by development and 
international relations scholars, can thus be understood and interpreted within the same 
theoretical framework familiar from and successfully employed in the aid allocation 
literature. However, self-interest seems to be substantively more important than 
developing country need and good governance, which plays some, if often inconsistent, 
role in the allocation of aid by and large does not matter for BIT programs. 
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40 Table 1. Summary descriptive variable information. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Sum of BITs  3250  3.02 4.02 0 19
ln GDP p.c.  3250  6.87 1.19 4.44 10.65
ln GDP  3250  22.59 1.71 18.49 27.76
%trade 3250  68.82 45.82 3.68 392.51
%secondary-edu 3250  37.78 27.77 1 112
years colony  3250  33.99 27.48 0 60
political similarity  3250  0.40 0.24 -0.59 0.95
%US military grants  3250  0.01 0.05 0 0.97
ln distance  3250  8.33 0.58 6.44 9.39
democracy 3250  -0.91 7.02 -10 10
common law  3250  0.32 0.47 0 1
41 Table 2. Cumulative BITs of developing countries with any OECD country. 
 
ln GDP p.c.  -0.353 
 (3.70)*** 






years colony  0.006 
 (1.72)* 
political similarity  0.807 
 (3.91)*** 
%US military grants  0.695 
 (2.01)** 












Log likelihood  -6062.8 
 
Notes: Analysis is by negative binomial regression. Observations are assumed to be 
independent across, but not necessarily within countries (clustering). Absolute z-values 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
42 Table 3. The BIT programs of selected individual developed countries. 
                I II III IV V VI VII
     
               
Germany UK  France  Italy  Japan  US  Netherlands
ln  GDP  p.c. -0.483 -0.554 -0.403 -0.552 -0.962 -0.736 -0.367
  (4.10)***             
               
             
               
             
               
             
             
         
               
             
         
             
               
             
               
             
               
             
               
               
         
(3.76)*** (2.69)*** (3.05)*** (1.79)* (3.47)*** (2.40)**
ln  GDP
 
0.238 0.370 0.282 0.546 0.509 0.077 0.446
(3.40)*** (3.72)*** (3.00)*** (5.64)*** (2.15)** (0.59) (3.72)***
%trade
 
0.008 0.014 0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.005 0.005
(2.66)*** (4.43)*** (1.76)* (0.22) (0.57) (1.02) (0.95)
%secondary-edu
 
0.014 0.020 0.029 0.025 0.001 0.036 0.010
(2.41)** (3.73)*** (4.61)*** (3.96)*** (0.04) (4.95)***
 
(1.33)
years  colony 0.082 0.003 0.002 0.074 -0.634 0.047
(2.40)** (0.28)  (0.24)  (6.46)*** (0.82)   (3.08)***
political  similarity
 
1.707 0.223 2.036 2.689 4.913 0.865 0.749
(2.16)** (0.39) (1.87)* (2.94)*** (1.55) (1.27) (0.91)
%US military grants 
 
-9.382  3.640  3.613 1.704 13.472 3.699 1.757
(0.69) (1.87)* (2.33)** (1.31) (2.04)** (3.69)*** (1.12)
ln  distance
 
-0.211 0.236 0.234 -0.202 -2.410 -0.837 -0.241
(1.18) (1.17) (1.27) (1.18) (2.06)** (2.09)** (0.91)
democracy
 
-0.020 0.005 -0.026 -0.041 0.079 0.013 0.028
(1.16) (0.31) (1.43) (1.89)* (1.57) (0.46) (1.33)
common  law
 
-0.274 -0.359 -0.635 -0.295 -0.121 -1.651 -0.447
(1.07) (0.55) (1.97)** (0.94) (0.13) (2.54)** (1.31)
Observations 1730 1583 2437 2773 2407 1604 2471
#  BIT  signatures 82 71 67 59 9 35 61
Log pseudo-likelihood  -288.4  -272.0  -249.9 -218.4 -25.8 -133.5 -233.1
Global  χ
2  of proportional 
















Notes: Analysis is by Cox proportional hazard estimation. Observations are assumed to be independent across, but not necessarily within 
countries (clustering). Absolute z-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
43 Table 4. Percentage increase in total count and hazard of BIT signature, respectively, 
following a one standard deviation increase in explanatory variable. 
 
   Total count Germany UK  France Italy  Japan  US  Netherlands
ln GDP p.c.  -34.3  -43.72  -48.28 -38.10 -48.15 -68.17  -58.35  -35.39 
ln GDP  77.4  50.23  88.27 61.97  154.38 138.78 n.s.  114.40 
%trade 26.9  44.28  89.93 31.64  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
%secondary-edu n.s.  47.52  74.26 123.74 100.22 n.s.  171.75 n.s. 
years colony  17.7  24.99  n.s.  n.s.  17.85 n.s.  n.s.  0.80 
political similarity  21.5  43.11  n.s.  44.26  62.26 n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
%US military grants  3.5  n.s.  19.96 19.80  n.s.  96.13  20.32  n.s. 
ln distance  -15.6  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  -75.87  -30.23  n.s. 
democracy n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  -25.01 n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
common law  -26.3  n.s.  n.s.  -25.80 n.s.  n.s.  -53.97  n.s. 
 
Note: n.s. means that the coefficient was estimated as not statistically significantly 
different from zero in tables 2 or 3. 
 
44 Appendix. Bilateral Investment Treaty schedules (up to 2001). 
 
Country France  Germany Italy  JapanNetherlands UK  US 
Albania 1995  1991  1991   1994  1994  1995 
Algeria 1993  1996  1991        
Angola     1997     2000   
Antigua and Barbuda    1998        1987   
Argentina 1991  1991  1990   1992  1990  1991 
Armenia 1995  1995  1998     1993  1992 
Azerbaijan 1998  1995  1996     1996  1997 
Bahrain           1991   
Bangladesh 1985  1981  1990 1998 1994  1980  1986 
Barbados   1994  1995     1993   
Belarus 1993  1993  1995   1995  1994  1994 
Belize           1982   
Benin   1978      2001  1987   
Bolivia 1989  1987  1990   1992  1988  1998 
Bosnia-Herzegovina   2001  2001   1998     
Botswana   2000           
Brazil 1995  1995  1995   1998  1994   
Brunei   1998           
Bulgaria 1989  1986  1988   1999  1995  1992 
Burkina Faso    1996      2000     
Burundi   1984        1990   
Cambodia 2000  1999           
Cameroon   1962      1965  1982  1986 
Cape Verde    1990  1997   1991     
Centr. Afr. Republic  1960  1965           
Chad 1960  1967  1969        
Chile 1992  1990  1993   1998  1996   
China 1984  1983  1985 1988 1985  1986   
Colombia           1994   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1972  1969          1984 
Congo, Rep.  1960  1965  1994     1989  1990 
Costa Rica  1984  1994      1999  1982   
Cote d'Ivoire    1966  1969   1965  1995   
Croatia 1996  1997  1996   1998  1997  1996 
Cuba 1997  1996  1993   1999  1995   
Czech Republic  1990  1990  1990   1991  1990  1991 
Dominica   1984        1987   
Dominican Republic  1999             
Ecuador 1994  1965      1999  1994  1993 
Egypt 1974  1974  1989 1977 1976  1975  1986 
El Salvador  1978  1997      1999    1999 
Equatorial Guinea  1982             
Eritrea     1996        
Estonia 1992  1992  1997   1992  1994  1994 
Ethiopia   1964  1994        
Gabon 1974  1969  1968        
Georgia 1997  1993  1997   1998  1995  1994 
45 Ghana 1999  1995  1998   1989  1989   
Greece   1961           
Grenada           1988  1986 
Guatemala 1998        2001     
Guinea   1962  1964        
Guyana   1989        1989   
Haiti 1984  1973        1985  1983 
Honduras 1998  1995      2001  1993  1995 
Hong Kong  1995  1996  1995 1997 1992  1998   
Hungary 1986  1986  1987   1987  1987   
India 1997  1995  1995   1995  1994   
Indonesia 1973  1968  1991   1968  1976   
Iran   1965  1999        
Israel 1983  1976           
Jamaica 1993  1992  1993   1991  1987  1994 
Jordan 1978  1974  1996   1997  1979  1997 
Kazakhstan 1992  1992  1994     1995  1992 
Kenya   1996  1996   1970     
Korea, Dem. Rep.      2000        
Korea, Rep.  1977  1964  1989 2001 1974  1976   
Kuwait 1989  1994  1987   2001     
Kyrgyz Republic  1994  1997        1994  1993 
Laos 1989  1996        1995   
Latvia 1992  1993  1997   1994  1994  1995 
Lebanon 1996  1997  1997     1999   
Lesotho   1982        1981   
Liberia 1979  1961           
Lithuania 1992  1992  1994   1994  1993  1998 
Macedonia 1998  1996  1997   1998     
Madagascar   1962           
Malawi              
Malaysia 1975  1960  1988   1971  1981   
Mali   1977           
Malta 1976  1974  1967   1984  1986   
Mauritania   1982           
Mauritius 1973  1971        1986   
Mexico 1998  1998  1999   1998     
Moldova 1997  1994  1997   1995  1996  1993 
Mongolia 1991  1991  1993 2001 1995  1991  1994 
Morocco 1975  1961  1990   1971  1990  1985 
Mozambique         2001    1998 
Namibia 1998  1994           
Nepal 1983  1986        1993   
Nicaragua 1998  1996      2000  1996  1995 
Niger   1964           
Nigeria 1990  2000      1992  1990   
Oman 1994  1979  1993   1987  1995   
Pakistan 1983  1959  1997 1998 1988  1994   
Panama 1982  1983      2000  1983  1982 
Papua New Guinea    1980        1981   
46 Paraguay 1978  1993  1999   1992  1981   
Peru 1993  1995  1994   1994  1993   
Philippines 1976  1997  1988   1985  1980   
Poland 1989  1989  1989   1992  1987  1990 
Portugal   1980           
Qatar 1996  1996           
Romania 1976  1979  1977   1994  1976  1992 
Russia 1989  1989  1989 1998 1989  1989  1992 
Rwanda   1967           
Saudi Arabia    1996  1996        
Senegal 1974  1964      1979  1980  1983 
Sierra Leone    1965        1981   
Singapore 1975  1973      1972  1975   
Slovak Republic      1998        
Slovenia 1998  1993  2000   1996  1996   
Somalia   1981           
South Africa  1995  1995  1997   1995  1994   
Sri Lanka  1980  1963  1987 1982 1984  1980  1991 
St. Kitts and Nevis    1985           
St. Lucia    1986        1983   
Sudan 1978  1963      1970     
Swaziland   1990        1995   
Syria 1977  1977           
Tajikistan              
Tanzania   1965  2001   1970  1994   
Thailand   1961      1972  1978   
Togo   1961           
Tonga           1997   
Trinidad and Tobago  1993          1993  1994 
Tunisia 1972  1963  1985   1963  1989  1990 
Turkey   1962  1995 1992 1986  1991  1985 
Turkmenistan 1994  1997       1995   
Uganda   1966  1997   1970  1998   
Ukraine 1994  1993  1995   1994  1993  1994 
United Arab Emirates  1991  1997  1995     1992   
Uruguay 1993  1987  1990   1988  1991   
Uzbekistan 1993  1993  1997   1996  1993  1994 
Venezuela   1996  1990   1991  1995   
Vietnam 1992  1993  1990   1994     
Yemen 1984  1974      1985  1982   
Yugoslavia 1974  1989      1976    2001 
Zambia   1966           
Zimbabwe   1995  1999   1996  1995   
 
47 